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(PRESIDENTIAL) POWERS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
DANIELA CARUSO*

1.

PresidentialPowers and FunctionalEquivalence

The comparative methodology embraced by Jenny Martinez, the first
speaker on this panel, is functionalism - a traditional tool for comparative
inquiries.' Functionalism starts from the pragmatic assumption that societies
sharing similar values will perform identical tasks even if by means of
different rules. Functionalism posits the possibility of comparing the relative
success of such rules, and hence borrowing useful insights from analogous
foreign experiences. 2
Accordingly, Professor Martinez has identified
functional common ground in various legal systems, analyzed the scope and
substance of presidential powers in several European States, and skillfully
compared the status of chief executives in the old Continent and in the U.S. 3
* Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law. Thanks to Jenny Martinez and
Mark Tushnet for their thought-provoking presentations, to Anna di Robilant, Gary Lawson,
and Francesca Strumia for insights and suggestions, and to Zachary Cochran, Stewart T.
Moran, Benjamin B. Strawn, and the rest of the staff of the Boston University Law Review.
The account of E.U. law and scholarly debates offered in this comment is necessarily quick
and abridged. Footnotes are kept to a minimum.
See generally KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KOTZ, INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW:
VOLUME 1 - THE FRAMEWORK (Tony Weir trans., Oxford Univ. Press 2d ed. 1987) (1977);
Max Rheinstein, Comparative Law: Its Functions, Methods, and Usages, 22 ARK. L. REV.
415 (1968-69); Max Rheinstein, Teaching Comparative Law, 5 U. CHI. L. REV. 615 (1937-

38).
Readers seeking an up-to-date account of European institutional developments should see
the following works: GEORGE A. BERMANN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN
UNION LAW (2d ed. 2002 & Supp. 2004); DAMIAN CHALMERS ET AL., EUROPEAN UNION
LAW: TEXT AND MATERIALS (2006); PAUL CRAIG & GRAINNE DE BURCA, EU LAW: TEXT,
CASES AND MATERIALS (3d ed. 2002); and EUROPEAN UNION POLITICS (Michelle Cini ed.,
2003). These volumes reference the literature that provides background for these pages.
2 See Oliver Brand, Conceptual Comparisons: Towards a Coherent Methodology of
ComparativeLegal Studies, 32 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 405, 409 (2007).
1 See generally Jenny S. Martinez, Inherent Executive Power: A Comparative
Perspective, 115 YALE L.J. 2480 (2006) (comparing executive powers in foreign
governments ranging from European nations such as Germany and France to Mexico and
South Korea). This Essay focuses only on Europe due to space constraints and to the limits
of my research focus. Cf. Annelise Riles, Wigmore's Treasure Box: Comparative Law in
the Era of Information, 40 HARV. INT'L. L.J. 221, 231-232 (1999) (identifying Eurocentrism as a feature of traditional or mainstream comparative law); Teemu Ruskola, Legal
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Based on her observation of presidency "in context," Professor Martinez
makes the important argument that the allegedly universal breadth of
4
"inherent" presidential powers is in fact a matter of political contingency.
This Essay, equally based on functionalist premises, shifts the focus away
from individual states and onto the legal system of the European Union (E.U.).
Here, comparison gets more haphazard. The E.U. is not a state. The failed
Draft Constitutional Treaty contemplated a number of state-like features, but
they were deemed excessively federalist and eventually had to be dropped out
of the ongoing institutional reform project. 5 According to some, the E.U. is a
federal structure in the making. 6 To others, it is little more than an
international organization endowed with regulatory functions, where the old
nation-states - as we have known them for centuries - still hold the levers of
power. 7 This half-empty, half-full sort of dispute depends in large part on the
fact that the line between state competences and E.U. competences is blurred
and discontinuous, so much so that it is hard to tell them apart without careful
case-by-case investigation. In any event, the E.U. is certainly far from being a
federal system t l'am~ricaine,and there simply is no E.U. presidential figure
meaningfully comparable to the U.S. chief executive. To be sure, there is no
dearth of presidents in the European Union. 8 In the Council of Ministers, the
Orientalism, 101 MICH. L. REV. 179, 181, 215 (2002) (questioning the enduring belief that
Euro-American legal systems are necessarily superior because they embrace the Weberian
concept of formal rationality).
'

Martinez, supra note 3, at 2510.

Stephen C. Sieberson, Did Symbolism Sink the Constitution? Reflections on the
European Union's State-Like Attributes, U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y (forthcoming
2008).
6 See Michael Burgess, Federalism and Federation,in EUROPEAN UNION POLITICS, supra

note 1, at 65.
7 See Ulrich Haltern, Pathos and Pathina:The Failureand Promiseof Constitutionalism
in the European Imagniation, in CHALMERS ET AL., supra note 1, at 84.

s This Essay refers to E.U. law as it stands in December of 2007. The acronym "E.U." is
used indistinctly to designate not only the European Union, but also the European
Community and the European Economic Community. This inaccuracy is meant to reduce
the technical complexities of these pages. For the exact and current structure of the E.U.,
see Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community, Dec. 29,
2006, 2006 O.J. (C 321) 37 [hereinafter TEC], and Consolidated Version of the Treaty on
European Union, Dec. 29, 2006, 2006 O.J. (C 321) 5 [hereinafter TEU]. When appropriate,
this Essay refers as well to two sets of proposed changes. The first set was embodied in The
Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, Dec. 16, 2004, 2004 O.J. (C 310) 1
[hereinafter Draft Constitutional Treaty], duly signed but famously voted down by referenda
in France and in the Netherlands. The second set of proposed changes is embodied in the
Reform Treaty, signed by the heads of all member states in Lisbon in December 2007 and
now in the early stages of the ratification process. The outcome of this process cannot be
anticipated at this stage. See Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and
the Treaty Establishing the European Community, Dec. 17, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 1
[hereinafter Reform Treaty].
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presidency rotates between the member states every six months. 9 If the
pending Reform Treaty is ratified by all the member states, the European
Council will have a president of its own. Other European institutions - the
Court of Justice, the Parliament, and most notably the Commission - also have
presidents,' 0 But this plurality is only evidence of weakness: the E.U.
presidency is diffuse, and therefore thin." 1 By contrast, each Member State has
one obvious chief executive - be it the head of state or of government,
2
depending on relevant constitutional specificities.1
The question then, in the functionalist mode embraced by Professor
Martinez, is whether the institutional architecture of the E.U. hosts any
practical equivalents of the U.S. presidency. 13 Does anyone or any body in the
E.U. hold decision-making powers similar to those of the U.S. President? In
particular, and to narrow the question down to a theme that is central to this
conference, does anyone or any body in the E.U. control the direction of
foreign policy, in a way that resembles the U.S. President's role in
contemporary foreign affairs? If so, a brief survey of the E.U. legal landscape
may bring some more food for thought to this already rich symposium.
Two disclaimers are in order. The first one concerns the methodology of this
Essay. Mark Tushnet, speaking on this panel, has questioned the normative
usefulness of comparative inquiries and discounted the relevance of technical
details in foreign law accounts. 14 He has exposed the weaknesses of
functionalism,' 5 cautioned us against the risk of generalization,' 6 and suggested
17
that the comparative enterprise is simply "a form of liberal education in law.'
These pages embrace entirely Professor Tushnet's qualifications.
My

9 TEC, supra note 8, art. 203.
10

Id. arts. 197, 214, & 233.

1 CHALMERS ET AL., supra note 1,at 106 (reporting different opinions on the feeble role
of the Council president.)

12Each member state's "Head[] of State or Government" is granted membership in the
European Council. TEU, supra note 8, art. 4.
13See Mark Tushnet, The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law, 108 YALE
L.J. 1225, 1228 (1999) [hereinafter Tushnet, Possibilities],stating:

Functionalism claims that particular constitutional provisions create arrangements that
serve particular functions in a system of governance. Comparative constitutional study
can help identify those functions and show how different constitutional provisions
serve the same function in different constitutional systems. It might then be possible to
consider whether the U.S. constitutional system could use a mechanism developed
elsewhere to perform a specific function, to improve the way in which that function is
performed here.
14Id. at 1308 ("[W]e can learn from experience elsewhere only to the extent that we
avoid too much detail about that experience."). Following this intuition, I shall give only a
summary view of many technical aspects of E.U. law.
15Id. at 1265-69.
16Id. at 1238.
17Id. at 1230, 1309.
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immediate aim is not to develop normative arguments based on comparative
analogies, but rather to contribute an outsider's perspective to this conference.
The E.U. is still in the process of defining its constitutional nature, and
reflections on the very essence of executive leadership at the crossroads of
national democracies are still open-ended in Brussels. A foray into E.U. law
makes it possible to suspend the conventional assumptions of U.S.
constitutionalism, and to revisit certain questions of presidential power in a
normative vacuum.
My second disclaimer concerns the possibilities of comparative law that go
beyond functionalist assumptions. 18 The quest for functional equivalence
introduces readers to a foreign experience in relatively intelligible terms. Such
introductions, however, are only the beginning of much larger comparative
investigations. 19 This Essay ends with pointers to other lines of inquiry that
this panel's comparative assessment might also encompass.
2.

The E.U. Executive

The E.U. system has a very strong executive branch, but heading the
executive is not a job for one person only. The body with the strongest
resemblance to State executives is the Commission.2 0 Each State government
selects one member of the Commission. 2' The Commission negotiates trade
agreements, oversees the implementation of laws, enforces antitrust rules, and
can be censored en bloc by the Parliament. 22 A strange hybrid of executive
and legislative features, the Commission also holds control over legislative
initiative as the exclusive entity which may propose new bills. 23 The
Commission is considered the true engine of European integration. Its staff is
entirely devoted to the promotion and success of E.U. policies.
Commissioners pledge allegiance to the Union only, rather than to their States
24
of origin.
The Council, another hybrid structure stemming from national executives, is
ultimately in control of legislative affairs. 25 National affiliations, however,

1 See Vernon Valentine Palmer, From Lerotholi to Lando: Some Examples of
ComparativeLaw Methodology, 53 AM. J.COMP. L.261, 263 (2005) (concluding that "[t]he
possibilities are endless" when it comes to comparative law).
19 See Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35
COLUM. L. REV. 809, 847 (1935).

See TEC, supra note 8, art. 211.
Id. art. 214(2). If the Reform Treaty is ratified, the number of Commissioners will be
reduced to two thirds of the number of member states. Reform Treaty, supra note 8, art.
20

21

1.18.
22 See Morten Egeberg, The European Commission, in EUROPEAN UNION POLITICS, supra
note 1, at 131.
23 See id.
24 See TEC, supra note 8, art. 213(2).
25 See id. arts. 202, 250, 251.
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remain crucial in its workings. Council ministers are current members of State
cabinets, sent to Brussels whenever26 proposed legislation deals with matters
within their respective competences.
In the European Community's original architecture, Council and
Commission would control the legislative process with only consultative input
from the Parliament. 27 Today, in most matters the Parliament has as much say
in the legislative process as the Council does, 28 but there is no question that the
core of the E.U. remains executive in nature.
Why nation-states with strong traditions of representative democracy would
allow for the supranational overgrowth of their cabinets, unencumbered by
close parliamentary oversight, is a matter of both political contingency and
historical happenstance. The Treaty of Rome was conceived of as a marketcentered agreement among sovereign states. 29 Its obvious political goals making war within Europe impossible, and creating a western bulwark against
Soviet expansion - were only side effects of the treaty's immediate
commercial and economic tasks: creating a healthy cross-border market and
promoting economic interdependence among Member States.
Interstate trade regulation and external commercial policy are typical
executive prerogatives. It only made sense then to allocate such powers to an
(elaborate) extension of states' cabinets. What we now call E.U. legislation
was then conceived of as a set of administrative acts, necessary simply for
implementing policies which would still be formulated by states' governments.
The Court of Justice's power of judicial review over such acts was designed
along the lines of mere administrative control (typical30 of French administrative
tribunals), not in the mode of constitutional scrutiny.
As the tremendous constitutional shift logically demanded by economic
integration became obvious, the E.U. gave itself increasingly visible
democratic credentials. In 1979, members of the Parliament were for the first
time directly elected by the peoples of Europe. The Parliament also acquired
judicial standing, stronger voice, and even veto power in most legislative
matters. In the eyes of many, however, the E.U. is still plagued by one form or
another of democratic deficit. 3! A creature of the executive, the E.U. may don
26

27

Id. art. 203.
See I BERMANN ET AL., supra note 1, at 51.

28 See TEC, supra note 8, art. 251.
29 See id. art. 2 (envisaging an entity engaged in "establishing a common market and
progressively approximating the economic policies of the Member States"). In its early
days, the Treaty establishing the European Community was only intended to abolish custom
duties, facilitate the movement of goods, labor, services, and capital, and to manage certain
economic policies such as agriculture, transport, and antitrust. See CHALMERS ET AL., supra
note 1, at 11-12.

30 See Ron Levi, La fabrique du droit: Une ethnographie du Conseil d' Etat, 1 L.

CULTURE & HUMAN. 137, 137 (Austin Sarat et al. eds., 2005).
31 See Andreas Follesdal & Simon Hix, Why There Is a DemocraticDeficit in the EU: A
Response to Majone andMoravcsik,44 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 533, 533-34 (2006).
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the outfit of a parliamentary democracy and speak with constitutional
grandeur. But, for better or for worse, it maintains the traits of an opaque
regulatory engine. Scholarly and political opinions vary extensively on this
issue, but prominent scholars make the point that the E.U. version of
democracy is one of a kind, with no match in either unitary or federal state
32
models.
Like many other things, Europe boasts mythical origins. Zeus allegedly fell
in love with Europa, a beautiful Phoenician girl. In order to seduce her, he
took on the irresistible semblance of a bull, and brought Europa from Lebanon
to Crete. 33 Structurally, this myth represents the shift of civilization from Asia
Minor to Europe, and the dawn of western dominance. 34 However, the
persistence of strong executive features and the weakness of political
participation in the E.U. may evoke a different myth. The E.U. is rather like
Athena, goddess of wisdom: a head born out of the head of Zeus, executive
from executive; a woman whose full body of democratic attributes has the only
function of keeping the head up, and letting the head lead.
3.

Foreign Policy

A bit of Euro-jargon is unavoidable. The E.U. is an intricate mix of
"intergovernmental" and "supranational" features. 3 5 "Intergovernmental" is a
term pointing at the autonomy and sovereignty of each member state. For
instance, direct taxation on personal income is an intergovernmental matter,
and so is control over military forces. By contrast, the word "supranational"
characterizes those Community competences which imply at least a partial
surrender of state sovereignty. In many matters, no single state has veto power
over decisions made by a majority of states, the European Court of Justice (the
ECJ) adjudicates issues of state compliance, and even state courts of ordinary
jurisdiction must contribute to E.U. law enforcement. Interstate trade is also
handled in an intensely supranational mode.
In general, the strength of E.U. powers varies noticeably from one area of
competence to the next. Even within the narrow sphere of foreign policy, the
Union's powers range from minimal to significant. 36 In strictly trade-related
matters, such as the definition of a common commercial policy, the Union has
exclusive and general competence. 37 The Commission speaks with one voice

32 See, e.g., J.H.H. Weiler, In Defence of the Status Quo: Europe's Constitutional
Sonderweg, in EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONALISM BEYOND THE STATE 7, 23 (J.H.H. Weiler &

Marlene Wind eds., 2003).
31 CHALMERS ET AL., supra note 1, at 3.
34 Id. at 4.

35 See J.H.H. Weiler, The Transformationof Europe, 100 YALE L.J. 2403, 2410 (1991).
36 PIET EECKHOUT,

EXTERNAL

RELATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN

CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS (2004).

3' TEC, supra note 8, art. 133.
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on behalf of all member states when negotiating trade issues in WTO rounds. 38
The Commission determines, with interpretive guidance from the ECJ, the
external reach of its antitrust policy. 39 E.U. legislation sets uniform custom
codes and tariffs upon imports anywhere in the E.U. 4 0 In other words,
commercial policy is entirely supranational and, as is often the case in the
management of external trade matters, the democratically elected assembly
(the Parliament) has virtually no role. As a result, when drafting trade deals,
the Commission has free rein, and only needs ex-post majority, not unanimous,
approval from the Council.
On the other hand, the political and military aspects of foreign policy are
still handled in intergovernmental fashion. Member states remain absolutely
sovereign in such matters, and while they may decide to pool their resources
and consult with one another, the political handling of foreign affairs remains
non-delegated state sovereignty. Most tellingly, there is no real European
army, 41 and hence no real Commander-in-Chief 42 An immediate example of
intergovernmentalism was given at the outset of the Iraqi war. As is well
known, Europe displayed a wide range of attitudes towards military
intervention, from materially supportive (United Kingdom) to firmly opposed
(France). Against this background, the question initially set forth in these
pages seems to receive an outright negative answer. The European Union does
not possess the equivalent of presidential powers with regard to foreign policy.
At a closer look, however, the picture proves more nuanced, and more
interesting.

38 See 2 BERMANN ET AL., supra note 1, at 1073.
" See CHALMERS ET AL., supra note 1, at 982-83.
40 See 2 BERMANN ET AL., supra note 1,ch. 30.
41 See Karen E. Smith, EU External Relations, in EUROPEAN UNION POLITICS, supra note

1,at 229, 238-240.
42 The European Union Military Staff is the body that comes closest to an E.U. army.
Established in 2001, the EUMS is "a General Directorate within the Council General
Secretariat [the Director General is currently Lt. Gen. David Leakey]. It is the only
permanent integrated military structure of the European Union." http://www.consilium.
europa.eu/uedocs/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id 1039&lang=en. The main operational functions
of the EUMS are early warning, situation assessment, and strategic planning. For the rest,
the military capabilities of the E.U. are a function of member states' voluntary contributions
of troops and infrastructure. On recent developments see EUROPEAN UNION FACT SHEET,
THE

E.U.

BATTLEGROUPS

AND

THE

E.U.

CIVILIAN

AND

MILITARY

CELL

(2005)

http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/Battlegroups.pdf; and James Shea, A
NA TO for the 21st Century: Toward a New Strategic Concept, 31 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF.
43, 47 (2007) (noticing that "the EU is developing its own military forces, such as the
recently launched EU battle groups, and initiating its own defense research and investment
programs via the newly created European Defence Agency").
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The Case ofEconomic Sanctions

Iran provides a better standpoint than Iraq to gauge the extent of presidential
powers in E.U. foreign policy. Despite talk to the contrary, military action in
Iran is not on the immediate European horizon. Economic sanctions, by
contrast, are already in place and more are imminent. The permanent members
of the United Nations Security Council are currently trying to agree on a third
round of sanctions. The task is proving difficult. Business with Iran is hard to
give away, and no sovereign nation wants to surrender its share unless
everyone else does, both officially and below the table.
Within the United Nations, the E.U. does not speak with one voice. All of
its members are represented as sovereign and independent parties. The E.U.
delegation has the status of mere observer. On the other hand, the E.U.'s role
is, de facto, a relevant one. The U.N. Security Council hosts two big E.U.
players: France and the United Kingdom. Germany is also a regular participant
in all informal talks, so that Security Council meetings are often referred to as
"5+1" affairs. While debating whether to impose a third round of sanctions on
Iran, the Security Council is collecting information not only from the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), but also from Javier Solana
(who is on a diplomatic mission on behalf of the European Union).4 3 Solana
bears a mouthful of a title: High Representative of the Union for Foreign
Affairs and Security Policy. 44 The switch to the more straightforward "Union
Minister for Foreign Affairs," foreseen in the draft Constitution, was voted
45
down because of its excessive supranational implications.
Foreign and security policy is recognized as a purely intergovernmental
matter, so much so that it is still kept, pending reform, in a separate "Pillar" in
the E.U. Treaty. 46 Unanimity, lack of enforcement capabilities, and veto
power for all member states are the rule in this Pillar. 47 Yet, when the strategy
of foreign and security policy is executed through a trade embargo, its
proximity with commercial policy is obvious. 48 As a result, intergovemmental
foreign politics comes close to the most supranational E.U. matter - external

43 See Council of the European Union, Summary of Intervention by EU High
Representative Javier Solana at the Conference of Foreign Affairs Committee Chairs of
National Parliaments of EU Member States (Mar. 17, 2008) http://www.consilium.
europa.eu/ueDocs/cmsData/docs/pressdata/en/discours/99522.pdf
(reporting Solana's
diplomatic initiatives in Iraq).
44 This is the title appearing in the Reform Treaty, supra note 8, art. 1.19, while the
current one is slightly less impressive: High Representative for the Common Foreign and
Security Policy. TEU, supra note 8, art. 18.3.
4$See Sieberson, supra note 5.
46 See TEU, supra note 8, tit. V. This part of the TEU, conventionally known as the
second Pillar, is characterized by a low degree of legal integration. See, e.g., id. arts. 23.1,
46.
41 See id. art. 23.1.
41 See, e.g., C-84/95, Bosphorus v. Ireland, 1996 E.C.R. 1-3953.
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Economic sanctions are devised by means of Council
trade policy.
49
regulations are aligned with relevant resolutions of the
These
regulations.
and require consistent compliance throughout the
Council
Security
U.N.
50
to deviate from the regulations for the sake of
attempts
Occasional
Union.
been ruled out by the ECJ as incompatible
have
reasons
political
state-specific
law.5 ' Solana's diplomatic role is a
of
E.U.
application
uniform
with the
formidable one because it secures compatibility between a very diverse
political outlook and an ultimately uniform trade policy.
If the Reform Treaty survives the process of national ratification, the role of
Solana's successors will be even more obviously straddled across politics and
52
trade. The High Representative, an intergovernmental entity, will be vicepresident of the Commission at the same time; therefore, the High
will be even closer to the supranational engine of legal
Representative
53
integration.
5.

FunctionalEquivalence?

The functionalist premise that justifies this excursus in E.U. law can now be
restated as follows: if someone, or some body, in the institutional architecture
of the E.U. gets to define the guidelines of conduct vis-A-vis the nuclear
ambitions of Iran, then the E.U. institutional machinery hosts powers that
overlap with those of the U.S. president in such matters. If any of the
institutions of the E.U. can control geopolitical strategies, then the54E.U. is a
proper subject of comparison in a conference on presidential powers.
As observed above, the E.U. executive powers in external matters are most
prominent in the trade sphere. By contrast, the military and diplomatic aspects
of external relations are controlled by Member States and only loosely
coordinated within the intergovernmental structure of the E.U.'s second Pillar.
The partition, however, is weak. A quick realist glance at the picture shows
how the back door of trade sanctions lets the E.U. executive exert meaningful
55
control over the foreign policies of the member states. In terms of substance,
41 Smith, supra note 41, at 232.

50Case C-124/95, The Queen exparte Centro-Com Srl v. HM Treasury, 1997 E.C.R. I81, 47.
51 Id. 24-25.
52 The High Representative will be chosen by the European Council. Reform Treaty,

supra note 8, art. 1.19.
53 Id.
54 See infra Part 7 (on the limits of such functional equivalences).
11 See Piet Eeckhout, Address at Leuven Centre for a Common Law of Europe, Ius
Commune Research School: Does Europe's Constitution Stop at the Water's Edge? Law
and Policy in the EU ExternalRelations (Oct. 7, 2005), in WALTER VAN GERVEN LECTURES
(5) 4 (Europa Law Publishing 2005), available at http://www.law.kuleuven.ac.be/

ccle/pdf/wvg5.pdf (explaining how "the conclusion of a trade agreement with a third
country may have stronger foreign policy than economic objectives"); Michel Petite,
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functional links between the powers of the E.U. executive and those of the U.S.
president exist indeed.
This statement posits the equivalence of display of military capabilities on
one hand and economic strategy on the other. Arguably at least, economic
sanctions can steer world politics and prevent or delay military action. In the
eyes of many, concerted economic pressure is a plausible and even astute
alternative to military threat. 56 The idea of effective geopolitical intervention
58
without war can generate humor, 57 but is taken very seriously in E.U. circles.
Recent history sheds light on Europe's specific attitude towards external
relations. Trade and politics are embedded together in the E.U.'s genetic code.
The E.U. came into being in the 1950s for the purpose of preventing another
war between Germany and France. 59 Economic integration was the way in
which the French and others embraced their historic German enemies and
hugged them all the way to military incapacitation. 60 To this day, the blending
of geopolitics and free trade is the hallmark of Europeanization. It is visible in
the recent accession of eastern European States, whose nascent democracies
are now firmly anchored to the moors of Antwerp. 61 The strategy of politics
through trade has not yet exhausted its potential. At every round of new
accessions, (political) peace and (economic) prosperity are the two sides of the
62
coin with which the E.U. seeks to purchase popular consent for enlargement.
Securing supranational control over external trade has historically granted
the E.U. ever growing political significance. In spite of colossal failures in the
Balkans, the E.U. has elsewhere succeeded at bypassing political conflict via
commercial collaboration. Europe may not have an army or a Commander-in-

Director-General, Legal Services of the EC, Current Legal Issues in the External Relations
of the European Union, Lecture at European University Institute, Academy of European
Law,
Florence
(July 7, 2006), available at http://www.ec.europa.eu/dgs/
legal-service/pdf/20060707extrel.pdf ("[T]he Commission has.., invited the Court to shed
greater light on the border line between the Community domain and the Common Foreign
Policy. This is not without reason, since especially development policy has many objectives
in common with the CFSP .... ").
56 See Kalypso Nicolaidis, The Power of the Superpowerless, in BEYOND PARADISE AND
POWER: EUROPE, AMERICA AND THE FUTURE OF A TROUBLED PARTNERSHIP 93, 94-96 (Tod
Lindberg ed., 2005).
17 Cf id. at 93 (recounting Aesop's story about a tail-less fox who persuaded all others
that tails were an unnecessary nuisance).
58 See ZYGMUNT BAUMAN, EUROPE: AN UNFINISHED ADVENTURE 39 (2004).
" See Derek W. Urwin, The European Community: From 1945 to 1985, in EUROPEAN
1, at 11.

UNION POLITICS, supra note
60 See id.

61 Antwerp is close to Brussels. Its port is of huge commercial importance in Europe,

hence the maritime metaphor.
62 European Commission - EU Enlargement - Homepage, http://ec.europa.eu/
enlargement/indexen.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2008) ("Enlargement.. . [extends] peace,
stability, prosperity, democracy, human rights and the rule of law across Europe.").
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Chief, but its strategy of diplomacy through trade may be just as important. If
one takes functionalism seriously, the E.U. has no real President, but it has real
executive power.
6.

Athena's Ratchet
The point of functionalism is to enable comparative reflections on
seemingly very different legal systems. It is now possible to look at the E.U.
legal order as a plausible source of relevant considerations. One feature, in
particular, is worth highlighting: in spite of undeniable enmeshment with
strongly supranational trade policies, foreign policy remains doggedly
intergovernmental in form. Symbolism is important, and the Reform Treaty
keeps the symbols of state sovereignty in foreign affairs at the forefront of its
text.63 In terms of institutional design, this insistence on traditional allocation
of powers keeps foreign affairs at least geographically close to the loci of
national politics.
As observed, the foreign policy of the E.U. is characterized by a striking
degree of executive dominance. 64 Within the traditional structure of a nationstate, keeping foreign affairs in the hands of the executive branch is normal; in
the context of the E.U., however, where democratic participation is remote and
accountability less obvious, this institutional feature comes across as
worrisome.
In the failed Draft Constitutional Treaty, there were a number of proposed
65
Of
reforms to formally emphasize the authority of the E.U. executive.
course, such executive enhancements came in a package that would have
significantly boosted participatory democracy. 66 Athena, head from head,
necessitates a body, and a heavier head calls for broader shoulders. It is in the
nature of strong executives to equip themselves with constitutional checks and
balances, so as to reinforce their own legitimacy in the aftermath of their
establishment. The story of the E.U. is indeed one of executive growth spurts,
legitimated ex post by attributes of representative and participatory
democracy. 67
Over the years, a combination of judicial activism and
administrative ingenuity has expanded the scope of E.U. competences far
beyond the seemingly narrow path of market integration. These same forces

63 Reform Treaty, supra note 8, art. 1.5 ("The Union shall respect the equality of

Member States before the Treaties as well as their national identities ....
In particular,
national security remains the sole responsibility of each Member State.").
I Eeckhout, supra note 55, at 3.
65 See, e.g., Draft Constitutional Treaty, supra note 8, art. 1-28 (establishing a Union
Minister of Foreign Affairs).
66 See, e.g., id.
67 The latest example of this pattern is given by the Reform Treaty, which on one hand

enhances the scope of the E.U. powers in several salient areas, and on the other hand
enhances the role of national parliaments in the making of E.U. law. See Reform Treaty,
supra note 7, art. 8c.
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transformed the Parliament from consultative body to legislator, and invented
68
unforeseen regulatory mechanisms.
Today, this growth pattern causes much apprehension in national politics. It
no longer seems sufficient to balance executive super powers with increased
democratization. The trend - at least in political Euro-jargon, if not in the
actual text of the Reform Treaty - is now one of consolidation of democracy
within the range of established E.U. competences. 69 Further expansion of E.U.
executive powers has been postponed. The Minister of Foreign Affairs that
Henry Kissinger once hoped for is no minister; the Commission's power is
diluted; the allocation of votes among Council Ministers is more openly linked
to the peoples of each nation; 70 and the European Council - an essentially
intergovernmental forum of heads of States - is more prominent than ever.
The old pattern seems to be politically on hold.
In the United States, a significant portion of the debate on presidential
powers is centered on the "ratchet" question. 7' Emergency powers, claimed by
the U.S. President on grounds of national security, get locked in and then
72
normalized through practice, judicial endorsement, and Congress's fiat.

Many scholars deplore such developments as politically dangerous and

68

See

GIANDOMENICO

MAJONE,

DILEMMAS

OF

EUROPEAN

INTEGRATION:

THE

143-44 (2005) (arguing that
'integration by stealth" has produced sub-optimal policies and a steady loss of legitimacy by
the supranational institutions).
69 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament,the Council, the
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Legislative
and Work Programme 2008, at 9, COM (2007) 640 final (Oct. 23, 2007), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/atwork/programmes/docs/clwp2008-en.pdf.
70 Reform Treaty, supra note 8, art. 1.17 (establishing that fifty-five percent of Council
members representing Member States comprising at least sixty-five percent of the E.U.
population forms a qualified majority).
71James Morone, Keynote address at Boston University School of Law Conference:
Extraordinary Powers in Ordinary Times (Sept. 29, 2006), video available at
http://www.bu.edu/law/events/audio-video/extraordinarypowers.html; see also Cynthia R.
Farina, Undoing the New Deal Through the New Presidentialism,22 HARv. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 227, 235 (1998), stating:
The new presidentialism arms the President to insist that he, uniquely, possesses the
constitutional prerogative, democratic mandate, and managerial competence to direct
the administrative state. These claims of singular entitlement and ability to control the
regulatory agenda establish a norm of confrontation, rather than collaboration. By
raising the stakes for other actors in the system, such hegemonistic claims may trigger
an oversight arms race. Indeed, many would say that this is exactly what happened in
the 1980s, as Congress reacted to what it perceived as aggressive unilateral White
House
deregulatory
initiatives with a variety
of equally aggressive
countermeasures.... If we encourage political actors to regard regulatory oversight as
a battle for the soul of the administrative state, we may be unpleasantly surprised at the
weapons each turns out to have available in its arsenal.
72 Morone, supra note 71.
AMBIGUITIES AND PITFALLS OF INTEGRATION BY STEALTH
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constitutionally unwarranted.7 3
Others consider the President's use of
emergency powers fully legitimate and even mandated by constitutional
74
design.
It may be meaningful to note, at the margin of this debate, that the once
anodyne ratchet-like pattern of legal integration is now under heavy suspicion
in European circles. As it is, the executive power of the Union in matters of
foreign policy is significant enough to prompt back-pedaling.
Further
centralization, if announced openly rather than through the backdoor of trade
policy, causes political resistance. The result is a patchwork of compromises,
awkwardly arranged within the structure of the Reform Treaty. For instance,
on one hand, the image of the E.U. presidency is strengthened. 75 Chosen from
within the European Council, an essentially intergovernmental institution, the
76
E.U. President will enjoy a relatively long and renewable term of 2.5 years.
The E.U. President will "ensure the external representation of the Union" in
matters of common foreign and security policy. 77 On the other hand, this
power is shared with the High Representative, 78 and, most importantly,
"national security remains the sole responsibility of each Member State. '79
The Union's way forward is a multi-level attempt to retain reasonable
distinctions between the legislative and executive functions of the Union, while
at the same time guaranteeing a strong role for both national executives and
national parliaments.
In the game of Europeanization, caution is the rule. The current point of
political equilibrium lies in the diffused control of foreign and security policy,
the stability of intergovernmental constraints, and the formal rejection of
untrammeled executive action. When the stakes are high, it is not enough to
control the executive from without. At the drawing table of institutional
reform, the point is the careful definition of the executive's inner scope and
structure.
7.

Other Possibilities

As always, functionalism bears its share of fruits. A liberal education in the
law benefits from a bird's eye view of the E.U. legal order, where the relation
between executive and law-making institutions is configured in very unusual
ways, and where a new constitutional design is currently being written on a
73See, e.g., David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the
Lowest Ebb: Framing the Problem, Doctrine, and Original Understanding, 121 HARV. L.
REv. 689, 692 (2008).
71See, e.g., Gary Lawson, Ordinary Powers in ExtraordinaryTimes: Common Sense in
Times of Crisis, 87 B.U. L. REV. 289, 299 n.55 (2007).
15See Reform Treaty, supra note 8, art. 1.16.
76

Id.

77 Id.
78 Id.

79Id. art. 1.5.
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clean slate. 80
The world of comparative law, however, is larger than
functionalism.
In Professor Tushnet's taxonomy of comparative
methodologies, expressivism is just as important. 8'
Comparative expressivism consists of identifying faux amis, namely legal
categories that seem identical in two legal systems yet carry very different
meanings due to varying cultural and historical backgrounds. In the context of
transatlantic comparison, James Whitman has recently given notable examples
of this methodology with regard to protection of privacy and separation of
church and state. 82 In the realm of constitutional architecture, expressivism
leads Jed Rubenfeld to posit that U.S. constitutional law is the result of the
national democratic process, and is therefore less permeable to international
influences; 83 in Europe, by contrast, the "legal" horrors of World War II
prompted higher regard for universal values and for international constraints
84
upon national constitutional law.
Both functionalism and expressivism aim at piercing the surface of legal
forms. Functionalists focus on similarities of substance, hidden by divergent
discourse. Expressivists focus on substantive differences, papered over by
common language.

80 See Jeremy Waldron, Dirty Little Secret, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 510, 527 (1998), stating:

[W]e have no interest in amusing ourselves with institutional possibilities that will fall

apart at the slightest stress. And so we should be looking not just to our imaginations,
but to the experience of other countries with various alternative systems, to see which
bright ideas have proven resilient under real life conditions and which have proven
impracticable.
81 Tushnet, supra note 1, at 1269.
Tushnet also identifies a third comparative
methodology, "bricolage," a term borrowed from Levi-Strauss, which consists of ad hoc,
unprincipled borrowings from foreign experience. Id. at 1285.
82 According to Whitman, the protection of privacy is an equally popular legal concept

See James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of
Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty, 113 YALE L.J. 1151, 1160 (2004). Whitman observes,
on both sides of the Atlantic.

however, that in the United States privacy refers to liberty from government's intrusion,
while in Europe it implies governmental protection against intrusion by media and the

market. Id. at 1161. By the same token, the United States's concept of separation of church
and state differs from its equivalent in Europe, where the state carries on the roles of social
assistance and community building once performed by the clergy. See James. Q. Whitman,
Church and State: Why are America and Europe so Different? 10 (Sept. 14, 2006)
(unpublished seminar paper on file with Kadish Center for Law, Morality & Publiic
Affairs), available at http://www.law.berkeley.edu/centers/kadish/Whitman%20Church
%20and%20State%20for/o2OBoalt%20091406.pdf.
83 See Jed Rubenfeld, The Two World Orders, WILSON Q., Autumn 2003, at 22, 27.
84

Id. at 24-25; see also

ROBERT KAGAN, OF PARADISE AND POWER: AMERICA AND

EUROPE IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER

(2003) (positing that "on major strategic and

international questions today, Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus").
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At the opposite end lies a strand of research that overlooks substantive rules,
85
and focuses on the uniformity of legal forms, terms, and figures of speech.
Uniformity of legal discourse carries no interest per se, but it becomes relevant
when its pervasive and virtually global diffusion steers public debate away
from issues that matter. 86 The discourse on constitutional reform in Europe is
characterized by headings that are coterminous with those of U.S.
constitutionalism - role of the President, extent of federalism, optimal level of
decentralization, institutional balance, etc. Along these lines, some of the
stickiest points in the failed Draft Constitutional Treaty were remarkably
predictable: How many votes per head in the Council of Ministers? 87 How
many seats per state in the European Parliament?8 8 How much more power to
the European Council? How much less to the Commission?8 9 Whitherjudicial
review? These variations on known themes took such discursive prominence
as to obscure issues of wealth redistribution, local government, and balance
between free markets and social protection. The risk of uniform juridical
thought is the suppression of other, less popular and less universal legal
issues. 90 Today, transatlantic comparison is at its best when it reveals a
dramatic absence of differences - a flattening of legal and political discourse
along lines vaguely characterized as "western," and increasingly detached from
meaning.

85 See generally MITCHEL LASSER, JUDICIAL DELIBERATIONS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

OF JUDICIAL TRANSPARENCY AND LEGITIMACY (2004) (comparing judicial discourse and

identifying overlaps in the adjudicatory styles of the European Court of Justice and the U.S.
Supreme Court)
86 See Daniela Caruso, Private Law and State-Making in the Age of Globalization, 39
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1, 6 (2006) (discussing the impact of a uniform western

conception of private law upon the development of post-national sovereignty.); Anna di
Robilant, Genealogies of Soft Law, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 499, 504 (2006) (reflecting upon the

concept of soft law as a category invented and re-invented by the West at large as a
metaphor for many diverse phenomena.).
87 HUGO BRADY & KATINKA BARYSCH, CTR. FOR EUROPEAN REFORM, THE CER GUIDE TO

THE

REFORM

TREATY

2

(2007),

http://www.cer.org.uk/pdf/briefing-reform

treaty-

l7oct07.pdf (discussing Poland's demand for additional votes in the Council of Ministers).
88 See EU Parliament Votes to Cut Seats for 17 Countries, EUBUSINESS, Oct. 11, 2007,
http://www.eubusiness.com/Institutions/I 192099627.04/ (explaining the issues involved in
capping the number of members of the European Parliament to 750, and Italy's ensuing

resentment).
8 The Reform Treaty foresees a diminished role for the Commission. See BRADY &
BARYSCH, supra note 87, at 2 (explaining that "after 2014, the number of commissioners
will be capped at two-thirds of the number of member-states. A rotation principle will
determine which country sends a commissioner for any given term").
90 See Duncan Kennedy, Three Globalizationsof Law and Legal Thought: 1850-2000, in
THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 19, 22-23 (David M.

Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006).
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